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HOW TO DEFEND RELIGIOUS REALISM 
Michael Scott 
This paper defends a realist theory of religious language and truth, the view 
that religious claims are truth-apt and that religious truth requires a realist 
non-minimalist construal. Two varieties of religious antirealism, expressiv-
ism and minimalism, are considered in detail and rejected. A realist theory 
is advanced using the Fregean distinction between thought, force, and tone, 
which aims to accommodate differences between religious and other fields of 
discourse. Alongside this discussion, Wittgenstein's remarks on religion are 
considered and a realist interpretation proposed. 
This paper has two interrelated aims. First, to evaluate two leading types 
of antirealism about religious language: expressivism, the view that reli-
gious claims lack truth-apt content but rather express attitudes, stances 
or other non-representational states; and minimalism, the theory that re-
ligious claims have truth-apt content but that religious truth is epistemi-
cally and evidentially constrained. I believe that both these theories are 
mistaken, though not for the reasons usually offered against them in the 
literature, and will argue this in Sections One and Two. Second, I will ar-
gue that while wrong, both antirealist theories correctly identify features 
distinctive of religious language that individuate it from other fields of 
discourse, and about which a satisfactory realist theory needs to give us 
an account. I will propose a way in which the realist can do this in Section 
Three. The kind of religious realism I will defend, therefore, concerns reli-
gious language and truth: religious claims are truth-apt, and we require a 
realist construal of religious truth. I will not be arguing here that religious 
claims are true, or discussing in detail the kinds of properties to which 
they refer. 
Alongside the arguments about antirealism I will discuss Wittgenstein's 
work on religion, which remains important source material for religious 
antirealism. Throughout his writings and lectures on religion, Wittgen-
stein provides examples of differences between religious language and 
other fields of discourse, notably science and history. Although Wittgen-
stein never (quite) explicitly endorses antirealism, his emphasis on dif-
ferences has given rise to two rival antirealist readings: expressivist and 
minimalist. On the former account, the differences Wittgenstein highlights 
show that religious discourse is not really descriptive; on the latter, they 
show that religious discourse has its own internal rules and standards of 
truth. Although inconsistent with each other, both theories find support 
in Wittgenstein's work, and I will review the evidence in Sections One and 
Two. J will argue however, that while Wittgenstein is right about many of 
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the differences between religious and other discourses, his interpreters-
and Wittgenstein to the extent that he endorsed them -is wrong about 
their antirealist implications. The differences can be accommodated by the 
realist, as I wiII show in Section Three. 
1. Expressivism 
Expressivism is the view that religious statements serve primarily to ex-
press (and possibly also evoke) non-representational states. Accordingly, 
the expressivist has a straightforward explanation of the differences be-
tween religious discourse and other judgements about what the world 
around us is like: the standards of evidence, the reasons given for belief, 
the prosecution of religious disagreements and arguments, etc. that are 
distinctive of religious discourse, can be understood as due to the under-
llying expressive function of religious claims. One crucial but disputed dif-
ference that expressivism is particularly suited to explain is the motiva-
!tiona 1 force of religious belief. Religious beliefs are intimately tied up with 
desires, decisions, intentions, actions, feelings, and they typically dispose 
the believer to engage in certain forms of activity (confession, worship, 
l~tC.) when the circumstances arise. The earliest expressivist account of re-
ligious discourse comes, rather surprisingly, from George Berkeley. Berke-
ley defends expressivism exclusively for the Christian mysteries such as 
original sin, the Trinity and grace, and puts the point about motivational 
force as follows: 'Faith, I say, is not an indolent perception, but an opera-
tive persuasion of the mind, which ever worketh some suitable action, dis-
position, or emotion in those who have it.'] Whether religious beliefs have 
this practical role is contentious, and I will return to the issue Jater in this 
section. But if religious beliefs do motivate, then the expressivist has an 
elegant account of their psychology, for religious beliefs express attitudes 
and, unlike cognitive states, are already inherently motivational. 
Despite the occasional defender, such as R. M. Hare2 or R. B. Braith-
waite,1 expressivism has never been a popular or even much considered 
antirealist option in philosophy of religion, despite having many pockets 
of support in theology (such as Don Cupitt, Gordon Kaufman, and Paul 
Tillich). Contemporary discussions of expressivism are typically brief and 
dismissive, and the objections against it are widely considered conclu-
sive. For example, Richard Swinburne, in rejecting Braithwaite's attempt 
to analyse religious claims in terms of intentions to carry out a particular 
behaviour policy, offers arguments that he believes may be extended to all 
varieties of expressivism: 
(A) A religious belief such as 'There is a benevolent God' cannot be 
merely an intention to behave such as 'show great consideration of 
all' (or whatever non-representational state the expressivist posits), 
because one may have the relevant stance without expressing it in re-
ligious terms. Similarly, to affirm the behaviour policy would not be 
enough to have the religious belief.4 
(B) The only way for us to settle the truth of expressivism would be ' a 
sociological and literary survey of what people who use credal sen-
tences think that they are doing and have thought that what they were 
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doing over the past two thousand years.' Swinburne believes that the 
realist will clearly be favoured in such a survey.5 
In his discussion of Kaufman's variety of expressivism, Plantinga offers a 
different line of argument: 
(C) It' encourages dishonesty an hypocrisy; it results in a sort of private 
code whereby one utters the same phrases as those who accept Chris-
tian belief but means something wholly different by them. You thereby 
appear to concur with those who accept Christian belief; in fact, you 
wholly reject what they believe.'6 
Notwithstanding the forcefulness with which these objections are ex-
pressed, none of them pose serious difficulties for a sophisticated expres-
sivist theory. 
Argument (B) is clearly wide of the mark. Both expressivism and real-
ism are theories about whether religious statements address a real subject 
matter; they are not theories about religious believers' opinions on this 
issue. Analogously, if we found that most people believed that arithmetic 
statements refer to entities independent of mind and language, even if the 
polled sample was drawn from professional mathematicians, we would 
have established only that mathematical realism is popular. Swinburne's 
argument is perhaps based on the assumption that expressivism must be 
a revisionary theory of religious language, such that it would be appar-
ent to the religious believer if religious claims expressed attitudes rather 
than representational states. Expressivism is at its most effective, however, 
when it argues that utterances that result from the expression of attitudes 
can exhibit all the realist-sounding talk of truth, facts, etc. characteristic 
of discourse which trades in truth-apt content. On this basis, we should 
not expect a poll to elicit any relevant information regarding the realism 
debate, because the behaviour of religious language can be accounted for 
on either expressivist or realist theories. One could not usefully ask, e.g., 
whether when it was claimed 'God exists' what is meant is that it is true 
that God exists or that God really exists or that it is a fact that God exists, 
since the expressivist can accommodate these claims. 'True' and 'really' 
and 'is a fact' have the expressive function of presenting an attitude or 
stance with more pronounced conviction. 
If the expressivist is to argue that religious claims can mimic the fea-
tures of cognitively contentful claims, we are owed an account of how and 
why they behave as if they are stating truth-apt content.7 However, the 
expressivist should have the resources to assuage this concern. For why 
shouldn't perceptions which in some contexts generate thoughts about 
the world that are articulated as the truth-apt content of sentences and 
beliefs, in other contexts stimulate attitudes which are expressed using 
similar sentential forms? Attitudes have no less claim than thoughts as 
integral and important features of human life, and their clear presentation 
and communication to others is no less crucial. By way of comparison, 
consider Simon Blackburn's useful discussion of an expression of gusta-
tory delight: 'Yummy!'8 Blackburn observes that this utterance expresses a 
non-representational state which could also be expressed by the sentence 
'It tastes yummy.' This sentence looks and behaves like a claim that has 
truth-apt content (someone could disagree: 'It's not yummy!'); but it does 
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not thereby cease to serve the same expressive function-on the surface it 
may appear as though it should be presenting a thought, but it still only 
expresses a pleasurable impression of taste. The surface syntax and be-
haviour of a sentence with non-representational content can, therefore, 
imitate that of a sentence with truth-apt content. 
Argument (A) addresses Braithwaite's attempt to identify religious be-
lliefs with commitment to particular behaviour policies. In contrast, the 
kind of expressivism we have been considering, which takes religious 
claims to express attitudes, allows for a more complex variety of behav-
iour as well as a wider range of non-representational states. An attitude 
may stimulate action or enter into decision making, depending on the 
circumstances, but the expressivist does not need (and would surely be 
wrong) to maintain that a religious belief has the intention to pursue a 
specific course of behaviour as part of its content. In this respect, Berkeley 
offers a superior model for the expressivist to Braithwaite. 
A man may believe the doctrine of the Trinity, if he finds it revealed in 
Holy Scripture ... although he does not frame in his mind any abstract 
or distinct ideas of trinity, substance, or personality; provided that 
this doctrine ... makes proper impressions on his mind, producing 
therein love, hope, gratitude, and obedience, and thereby becomes a 
lively operative principle, influencing his life and actions, agreeably 
to that notion of saving faith which is required in a Christian.9 
Berkeley broadens the account to include non-representational states 
other than just intentions to behave, and allows that different particu-
lar courses of (good and Christian) action and habit may be effected by 
these attitudes. 
(A) would still be an effective objection against an account tied to the 
implausible thesis that each type of religious belief is an attitude-type-
such as Braithwaite's risible example of 'There is a God' and love of hu-
manity. Such an account is unsustainable against plentiful examples of 
different attitudes associated with the same type of belief. However, all 
that the expressivist needs to maintain is that the psychological history 
that results in religious judgement does not essentially involve truth-apt 
content at all, but only non-representational states; in short, the origin of 
religious judgement is found in our conative rather than our cognitive 
side. The difficulty in settling which particular attitudes are expressed by 
a religious belief, therefore, is not a serious consideration against expres-
sivism. The attitudes in question may be varied and have complex rela-
tionships with other attitudes, as well a complex history to disentangle. 
So, contrary to Swinburne's argument, we should not expect, on the ex-
pressivist account, either that possession of an attitude is enough to have a 
religious belief, or that a religious belief always requires a type of attitude. 
What is needed for a serious realist challenge is a demonstration that the 
expressivist story about the conative origin of religious judgement is false 
or at least incomplete. 
While it may have merit as a criticism of Kaufman, the charge of hypoc-
risy in argument (C) against the kind of expressivism we are considering 
is clearly unwarranted. The expressivist claims to offer a general analysis 
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of the meaning of religious claims; there is no attempt to dishonestly buy 
into realist sounding religious claims without also believing them. Indeed, 
it would be straightforwardly inconsistent for the expressivist to maintain 
that religious claims have an expressive role while also secretly believing 
them really to be false (i.e., to believe that religious claims have a truth-apt 
content which is false). A genuine religious belief, for the expressivist, con-
sists in genuinely partaking in the relevant attitudes and behaviour; hy-
pocrisy is to make a show of expressing attitudes that one does not really 
have, e.g., upholding one attitude in public and maintaining a different at-
titude in private. It might be argued that since the expressivist is claiming 
that religious beliefs are really expressions of attitudes they are not really 
beliefs, so it is dishonest to pretend as if they are. This argument is easily 
bypassed, however, by presenting the expressivist's case as distinguishing 
two different types of belief: 'input' beliefs about the world with truth-apt 
content, and' output' beliefs related to practical states. According to the 
expressivist, religious beliefs are of the latter kind. 
Plantinga's argument would have more bite in the following case. Sup-
pose one has concluded that religious claims are false, but that they have a 
useful secondary function of expressing attitudes. Moreover, that although 
religious discourse fails in its primary role of representing the world, it is 
still worth engaging in because the secondary expressive function is par-
ticularly valuable. Such an option is suggested by Robin LePoidevin1o and 
is a plausible reading of CupittY Someone who actually adopted this po-
sition would be using religious claims purely instrumentally as a means to 
express attitudes, and also in the uncomfortable and morally questionable 
situation of claiming that, e.g., there is a God (thereby displaying the rel-
evant attitudes), while at the same time not really believing that it is true 
that there is a God. This is not, however, a problem for the expressivist. 
Although expressivism can be defended against the main objections in 
the literature, the theory should be rejected as a general account of reli-
gious claims. There are, I think, two main difficulties. The first, akin to the 
Frege-Geach objection to ethical expressivism, is that by denying truth-apt 
content to religious claims, expressivism is unable to do justice to the logic 
of religious claims and arguments. For example, take a simple modus po-
nens with the first premise 
(PI) Jesus is risen 
which the expressivist takes to express an attitude or a complex of atti-
tudes. Suppose the second premise is 
(P2) If Jesus is risen then there will be a Last Judgement for all. 
From which follows with validity 
(P3) There will be a Last Judgement for all. 
The conclusion (P3), as with (PI), can be interpreted as an expression of 
attitudes. But it is not clear how the expressivist should interpret the con-
ditional. If (P2) is to get us from (PI) to (P3), then it must express some-
thing like: if you accept the attitudes expressed in the antecedent (PI) then 
you must also accept the attitudes expressed in the consequent (P3). The 
problem, however, is what 'must' means here. Since (PI) and (P2) do not 
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trade in truth-apt content, one would not contradict oneself by accepting 
them and rejecting (P3). To do so would at most count as some practical 
confusion of attitudes. Similar considerations will apply to all religious 
arguments, everything from the ontological argument, arguments about 
God's properties, the reasons for pluralism rather than exclusivism, infer-
ences drawn from biblical considerations, etc. Now, the expressivist could 
bite the bullet here and accept that it follows that none of these areas of 
religious discourse should be taken at face value, but must be construed in 
terms of attitudes and commitments. The problem, however, is that there 
is a profusion of logically well-formed arguments in religious discourse. 
This makes expressivism a hugely revisionary project, and highly implau-
sible without compelling reasons to pursue it in the first place. 
A second argument concerns the explanatory relationship that religious 
discourse has with claims in other fields of discourse for which expressive 
theories are not commonly advanced, such as history or science. It is not 
just that scientific and historical evidence are used in supporting religious 
claims, it is also that religious claims are used as explanations of histori-
cal and scientific facts. God's action in the world is taken as an account of 
why certain events occur; his existence may be posited as an explanation 
for, say, fine tuning conditions of the universe or laws of nature, etc. If 
religious claims express attitudes, how can claims with truth-apt content 
provide evidence and justification for them, and vice versa? Short of tak-
ing the heroic path of trying to advance an expressivist account of those 
areas of discourse with which religious claims enter into an explanatory 
relationship, the only option for the expressivist is to argue that religious 
explanations should not be taken at face value. For example, perhaps it 
could be argued that a religious explanation effects a change of attitude 
to the facts that it 'explains' or which 'explain' it. So when one posits God 
as an explanation of fine tuning conditions, for example, what one really 
does is express a certain attitude towards those conditions. This argument 
stretches plausibility, for it is entirely possible to evaluate many of these 
explanations by using formal techniques. For instance, some design ar-
guments can be assessed using Bayes' theorem, where God's existence is 
taken as a hypothesis with a certain probability. It is difficult to see a viable 
expressivist reading of this use of religious language. 
Expressivism is not, therefore, satisfactory as a general theory of reli-
gious discourse. However, this does not absolve the realist from account-
ing for those features of religious discourse which motivate expressivism 
in the first place. For example, in confession, prayer, ritual practice and 
day to day religious activities, there is religious discourse which has an 
expressive and evocative purpose. When such examples are used to sup-
port an expressivist account, the realist can reasonably point out that the 
expressivist has lost focus on core beliefs such as 'God exists' for which the 
expressive role is harder to place, and the truth-apt content of the claims 
seems evident. But this strategy delays acting on the realist's obligation 
to explain how the evocative and expressive role of religious claims fits 
with a realist theory. For all that expressivism has been criticised, short of 
denying that religious claims have any expressive function at all, we need 
some account of how this sits alongside a truth-apt content as components 
of the same utterance. 
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A second respect in which the expressivist case has merit is that reli-
gious beliefs seem to have motivational force. According to religious in-
ternalism, it is essential to religious belief that it is linked to some modi-
fication of one's outlook and dispositions. So someone who believes in, 
e.g., the Last Judgement (and who is not psychologically dehabilitated), 
should engage or be disposed to participate or abstain from certain behav-
iour. Religious internalism is disputed by Swinburne, who asserts that we 
can imagine a person who has faith but does not act on it. If this is to be an 
effective counterexample to internalism, the agent would have to have a 
belief that is, as Berkeley puts it, 'wholly inert.' Is such inert faith possible? 
It would not be inert if, for example, the agent had other attitudes, such as 
a determination not to act on faith under any circumstances, which had 
the effect of suppressing the belief's effects. But in other apparent cases of 
inert belief, the religious internalist will argue, the total failure to act on 
the belief is precisely what shows that the belief is not sincere or genuine. 
So Swinburne's claim that we can imagine someone who has a religious 
belief but is not disposed to act on it does little to progress the argument, 
for whether such a case makes sense is precisely what is at issue. The reli-
gious internalist will have to concede that, unlike an ethical belief concern-
ing the rightness or wrongness of a type of action, a religious belief does 
not commit one to a specific form of behaviour; but this does not under-
mine the intuition that to be sincere, a religious belief should have a direct 
impact on one's life and behaviour that goes beyond it merely adding to 
one's stock of beliefs. 
It is not my aim here to press the internalist case against Swinburne, 
but only to show that the internalism is a plausible position and that mo-
tivational force is something the realist needs to account for. However, 
there is some room for compromise between the internalist and those 
who think that inert religious beliefs are possible. For it would be enough 
for the internalist to argue that inert religious beliefs constitute a special 
and unusual class of cases. Consider, for example, an inert belief in God. 
If the belief is inert, the agent adds the fact that there is a God to their 
stock of information, but there is no affective aspect to the belief, and the 
agent's desires and motivations are otherwise unchanged. The internalist 
could plausibly argue that while the agent has a religious belief, in the 
thin sense in which it is a belief with a religious subject matter, we would 
nevertheless not say that this agent has faith, for which some change of 
outlook seems requisite. That is, the internalist could defend the thesis 
for religious faith, while allowing for the possibility of inert beliefs with 
religious content. 12 
If attitudes playa constitutive role in the meaning of religious claims, 
then the religious realist needs a theory that accommodates attitudes 
alongside truth-apt content. I will outline such a theory in Section Three. 
To conclude this discussion of expressivism, I will consider whether Witt-
genstein is an expressivist. Many contemporary commentators are keen to 
clear him of any taint of the theory:13 Wittgenstein may have emphasised 
differences between religious and other areas of discourse, but not with 
the aim of casting doubt on the cognitive content of religious discourse. 
Such writers typically prefer the minimalist interpretation I will set out in 
Section Two. However, there is plenty of evidence that Wittgenstein was 
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sympathetic to an expressivist position about religion (and ethics). Since 
the evidence for this has been considered in detail elsewhere,14 I will give 
here some choice examples. For instance, in 'A Lecture on Ethics' from 
1929, Wittgenstein distinguishes two states, a 'wonder at the existence of 
the world' and 'the experience of feeling absolutely safe.' He then pro-
ceeds with a fairly crude expressivist analysis: 
the first of [these experiences] is, I believe, exactly what people were 
referring to when they said that God had created the world; and the 
experience of absolute safety has been described by saying that we 
feel safe in the hands of God. A third experience of the same kind is 
that of feeling guilty and again this was described by the phrase that 
God disapproves of our conduct. IS 
Evidence of Wittgenstein's expressivism is found throughout his later ca-
reer. Expressivist remarks are found in Wittgenstein's comments on par-
ticular types of religious belief, notably predestination: 'this is no opin-
ion - also not a conviction, but an attitude towards things and what is 
happening.!J6 Wittgenstein also appears to adopt expressivism with re-
gard to religious discourse more generally: 
Religion says: Do this! - Think like that! But it cannot justify this and 
it only need try to do so to become repugnantY 
A remark that can be understood as claiming that religious belief is not 
about the acceptance of truth claims, but the adoption of a range of firmly 
held attitudes. 
A frequently cited reason for supposing that Wittgenstein is not an ex-
pressivist is his response to a lecture student in a discussion of belief in life 
after death. 1H When asked whether this belief is the same as expressing a 
certain attitude, Wittgenstein answers: 'I would say "No, it isn't the same 
as saying 'I'm very fond of you'" -and it may not be the same as anything 
else.'19 Unfortunately, this argument founders on a basic distinction be-
tween subjectivism and expressivism, or between reporting and express-
ing an attitude. The theory that in uttering a religious claim one is report-
ing one's attitudes entails that religious claims have truth-apt content, i.e., 
that one has such and such mental states. Wittgenstein appears to take the 
student's question as asking whether religious claims report attitudes, and 
so could be replaced by a statement of how one feels. Moreover, Wittgen-
stein is surely right to reject subjectivism: if religious claims have truth-
apt content it is not about the believer's feelings or dispositions. If one 
wanted to claim that one felt fondness, there is a language of mental states 
in which to do so. On the expressivist's theory, in contrast, religious claims 
express attitudes, and there may no other way for the believer to convey 
the particular attitudes in question. 
There is therefore much in Wittgenstein's writings which tallies with 
an expressivist account, but there are difficulties in providing a compre-
hensive expressivist account of Wittgenstein's position. In the following 
discussion of minimalist readings of Wittgenstein I will set out some evi-
dence which supports a different antirealist theory according to which 
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religious claims do have a truth-apt content. I will argue that neither an-
tirealist reading is satisfactory, and in Section Three present a different 
(realist) theory that accounts for those aspects of Wittgenstein's work on 
which expressivism and minimalism draw. I intend, of course, that this 
will converge with the aim to set out a theory of religious language that 
preserves realism while doing justice to the important role played by at-
titudes and other non-representational states in religious life. 
2. Minimalism 
Minimalist theories of religious discourse, rather like more sophisticated 
forms of expressivism, allow that religious claims may be true or factual 
or refer. However, while the expressivist believes that religious claims lack 
truth-apt content, and that the talk about truth, facts, etc. is the upshot 
of the expression of attitudes mimicking realist sounding discourse, the 
minimalist argues that religious claims do have truth-apt content, but sets 
minimal standards for satisfaction of these properties. There are differ-
ent minimal analyses of these terms available, but in general any field of 
discourse that possesses a functioning truth predicate and has disciplined 
internal standards will allow for their application. For example, a mini-
malist may argue that the content of truth is largely exhausted by the dis-
quotational schema: 
(OS) '5' is true if and only if 5 
where '5' may be replaced by any sentence of the discourse in question. 
On this view, OS, and anything deriving from it, gives us all that is infor-
mative that can in general be said about truth. A minimal reading of OS 
is that it links the truth of a sentence (the left hand side) with the case in 
which we may assert 5 (the right hand side), and vice versa. Prima facie, 
given this reading of OS, the schema is preserved if we analyse truth in 
terms of warranted assertibility within the discourse. In practice, this par-
ticular analysis has proved philosophically problematic and other read-
ings have been proposed; Crispin Wright's superassertibility has so far 
proved philosophically resilient.20 In general, however, the minimal ap-
proach takes truth to be a characteristic of sentences that, subject to vari-
ous conditions, satisfy internal standards of warrant within the discourse. 
As such, truth is 'evidentially constrained' because it cannot outstrip our 
ability (in principle) to justify (or warrantedly assert or superassert) sen-
tences. It is 'epistemically constrained' because, for the same reason, all 
truths are in principle knowable. 
The minimalist strategy can be extended to other controversial terms. 
Such and such is a fact, for example, just in case the sentence reporting it is 
true (minimally understood). Reference might be analysed as a feature of 
singular terms which occur in true sentences (minimally understood). The 
minimalist might also make use of the notion that true sentences correspond 
to reality, since it is merely platitudinous that true statements correspond 
with 'the facts.' When applied to religious discourse, it can be seen that the 
minimalist can quickly win through to the notion of religious truth, refer-
ence and facts. For religious language has a functioning truth predicate, 
sentences with relevant syntactic complexity and generally acknowledged 
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internal standards of appropriateness for religious judgements. By setting 
such a low bar for the possession of the core concepts at issue in the re-
alist/antirealist debate, minimalists can help themselves to realist terms 
without conceding anything to realist theory. 
The most familiar form of religious minimal ism is associated with Witt-
genstein. Wittgenstein, on this account, takes religion to be a field of dis-
course (or 'language game(s)') independent from other fields of discourse 
such as science or history by virtue of its distinctive religious standards of 
warrant. Since truth-apt content and religious truth are already minimally 
secured, the philosophical debate about realism is taken to be 'dissolved,' 
and the main philosophical task is to describe differences between reli-
gious and other areas of discourse. For example, Hilary Putnam-highly 
sympathetic himself to minimalism - argues:21 
The Wittgensteinian strategy, I believe, is to argue that while there 
is such a thing as correctness in ethics, in interpretation, in math-
ematics, the way to understand that is not by trying to model it 
on the ways in which we get things right in physics, but by trying 
to understand the life we lead with our concepts in each of these 
distinct areas. 
Similar thoughts are found in D. Z. Phillips' recent work on Wittgenstein.22 
Following the structure of Section One, I will consider the merits of mini-
malism as an account of religious language, then proceed to whether Witt-
genstein upheld such a view. 
An argument against minimalism, as well as the most cited objection 
to Wittgenstein, is that the theory has the effect of quarantining religious 
discourse from other areas of discourse, in particular science and history. 
The approach is seen as leading to fideism, where religious discourse 
is compartmentalised and unsusceptible to intellectual evaluation. For 
example, Kai Nielsen argues that 'What, however, Wittgenstein does 
stoutly argue for, and Malcolm and Winch follow him here, is that the 
giving of reasons, justifications and explanations comes to an end ... at 
the existence of the language-games and the associated forms of life.'23 
As a result 'no philosophical or other kind of reasonable criticism, or for 
that matter defence, is possible for forms of life or, indeed, of any form 
of life, including Hinduism, Christianity and the like.'24 However, while 
this objection may be appropriately directed against some Wittgenstei-
nians, it is ineffective against a properly thought through minimalism 
(or, on this reading, Wittgenstein himself). For there is nothing about 
looking at or describing the internal standards of religious discourse that 
precludes the possibility that scientifically or historically well founded 
evidence informs religious judgement. The minimalist is in no position 
to claim a priori that 'scientific discourse' and 'religious discourse' (or lan-
guage games) constitute discrete, independent entities. These are simply 
terms for broad areas of language, roughly distinguished by practices, 
standards of evidence and subject matter. A description of religious dis-
course, therefore, cannot assume but must establish its relationship with 
science with evidence from language use. Moreover, since historical evi-
dence clearly is weighed in debate about Christ's resurrection, or the cre-
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ation of the world, etc., any description of religious discourse would be 
seriously remiss and self-defeating in not acknowledging it. Where the 
minimalist analysis gets interesting is, once the use of evidence has been 
acknowledged, specifying what its role is in the justification of religious 
claims. I will return to this point shortly. 
Minimalism provides a useful starting point for debates about realism, 
because it sets out the very minimal sufficient conditions for truth and 
truth aptness that could be satisfied by any reasonably sophisticated and 
disciplined field of discourse. Where minimalism becomes antirealist is 
in maintaining that no more robust conception of truth is found in the 
discourse in question. I.e., we are not entitled to say that religious truth 
is anything more than warranted assertibility (or some other evidentially 
and epistemically constrained notion). With regard to religious discourse, 
therefore, a key question will be whether religious truth exhibits features 
that show that the truth of religious claims depends on a religious reality 
and is not merely determined by the internal standards of religious dis-
course. Crispin Wright sets out the debate as follows: 'if the realist wins 
... we shall be forced to think of the truth of [the discourse's] statements 
as conferred by functions other than those with determine proper practice 
within the discourse, and hence as being, in whatever sense is thereby 
imposed, not of our making but a matter of a substantial relationship be-
tween language, or thought,. and independent states of affairs.'25 Wright 
goes on to set out a number of other tests for more than minimal truth. I 
believe that religious truth can be shown to be realist on all of these tests. 
For current purposes, however, I will briefly present just one respect in 
which religious discourse is not minimally truth-apt, which concerns the 
relationship between religious claims and evidence. 
Where we are considering, e.g., talk about what is funny, the minimalist 
account of truth seems about right: it isn't plausible to posit truths about 
what is funny that lie beyond our ability (even in principle) to establish. 
Insofar as we allow that there are truths about what is funny, they seem to 
fall firmly within what can be known. The same case is at least arguable, 
though considerably more controversial, for ethics, aesthetics and math-
ematics. However, it is not arguable for religion. Religion posits facts that 
lie beyond what we can know; it is an integral part of many religions that 
there are limitations on what religious truths humans have access to. An 
obvious class of cases are statements about God's actions and thoughts. 
Such statements the religious believer will maintain are determinately true 
or false, but human knowledge of them is strictly limited to what God re-
veals about them. Truths that God has not revealed may entirely outstrip 
human capacities to determine them. 2h In this respect, therefore, religious 
discourse must be more than minimal, for it cannot plausibly be main-
tained that religious truth is epistemically or evidentially constrained. 
I suggested earlier that minimalist readings of Wittgenstein have be-
come increasingly popular, and there is plenty of evidence in favour of 
this account. He certainly supports a minimal theory of truth: "'p" is true 
= p, lip" is false = not-p, and to say that a proposition is whatever can be 
true or false amounts to saying: we call something a proposition when in 
our language we apply the calculus of truth functions to it.'27 Also, much 
of what he says about religion is consistent with a minimalist reading.28 
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However, there is contrary evidence. On the minimalist reading, one 
would expect Wittgenstein to happily admit truth, facts, etc., as entirely 
unproblematic ways of talking about religious claims. Yet Wittgenstein 
rarely talks in these terms, and whenever he addresses the status of reli-
gious belief he appears to question whether it is a genuine belief at all- an 
approach one would expect from an expressivist. In addition to this, there 
is all the evidence that Wittgenstein was an expressivist cited in the pre-
ceding section. The expressivist and minimalist disagree on whether reli-
gious claims have truth-apt content. So it seems that either Wittgenstein 
himself is confused about the issue, or one or both of these interpretations 
is mistaken. In the following section I will take this last option and suggest 
a further possibility. 
While I have argued that the minimalist theory is mistaken as an account 
of religious discourse, there is one important feature of religious discourse 
to which Wittgenstein and the minimalist draw attention and which a re-
alist should account for. This is the distinctive standards characteristic of 
religious language, specifically with regard to the role of evidence. Witt-
genstein is usually taken to have a radical view about this, primarily be-
cause of his notorious contention that 'the Gospels might, in the historical 
sense, be demonstrably false, and yet belief would lose nothing through 
this ... because historical proof (the historical-proof game) is irrelevant to 
belief.'29 Wittgenstein is generally taken to mean that empirical evidence is 
unrelated or to has a marginal role in religious considerations. Unsurpris-
ingly, this has fuelled the fideist charge against Wittgenstein. But I want 
to suggest another reading according to which Wittgenstein is offering a 
somewhat more modest proposal. The modest proposal is that the evalua-
tion of the historical evidence is not a standard or norm against which the 
religious claim is deemed acceptable. Religious claims may form part of 
scientific or historical explanations, and scientific or historical information 
may playa role in religious reasoning, and provide supportive evidence 
for religious beliefs; good evidence may indeed be desirable, but its role 
is not normative. That is, it is not a standard of religious discourse that a 
religious belief must be historically or scientifically well-founded.30 
It is consistent with the modest reading of Wittgenstein that the evi-
dence for, say, the empty tomb would provide welcome supportive evi-
dence for the religious belief that Jesus is risen. Supporting evidence may 
be desirable to the religious believer because, e.g., it assists in leading non-
believers to faith, or at least impedes the non-believer's rejection of the 
religious belief. So Wittgenstein is not recommending disavowal or even 
disinterest in historical or scientific evidence on the part of religious be-
lievers. The position is rather that historical and scientific evidence is nei-
ther sufficient nor a necessary condition for making a true religious judge-
ment or accepting a religious belief. Consequently, it is possible that there 
should be a belief against which there is a great deal of historical/scientific 
evidence, but which is nevertheless religiously acceptable-and this is 
the point being made in the quoted passage. Moreover, irrespective of its 
merits as an interpretation of Wittgenstein, the proposal seems correct. It 
seems right to say, for example, that the degree of belief accorded to an 
article of faith is not proportioned to the scientific or historical evidence in 
favour of it. Nor is someone who believes, for example, that Jesus is risen, 
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remiss or mistaken according to the standards of religious discourse for 
not considering the historical evidence in favour of that belief but rather, 
e.g., trusting in the Bible. Now, the relationship between religious belief 
and evidence is a question typically raised in religious epistemology, but it 
also bears on the problem of religious realism. That is, the religious realist 
needs to accommodate the distinctive role played by evidence in religious 
reasoning and belief, while also maintaining a non-minimal account of 
religious truth. I will do this in the following section. 
3. Force and Content 
In the first two sections I considered and rejected two leading antirealist 
accounts of religious language. I argued that there are certain distinctive 
features of religious language to which expressivism and minimalism ap-
peal which, while not enough to justify antirealism, need to be accounted 
for by any satisfactory realist theory: the intimate connection between re-
ligious belief and attitudes, and the use of evidence in religious discourse. 
Wittgenstein also emphasised these differences in his remarks on religion, 
which have given rise to antirealist interpretations. In this section, I will 
set out a realist theory that accommodates these differences, and apply it 
to Wittgenstein. 
The realist is primarily concerned to uphold the truth-apt content of 
religious claims, where truth aptness and the truth predicate in religious 
discourse are construed as robust and non-minimal. However, it is pos-
sible to combine this realist theory of the content of sentences with various 
accounts of other components of their meaning. Some distinctions due 
to Frege and Michael Dummett are useful hereY Frege takes there to be 
three ingredients of the meaning of a sentence: the thought (or sense), 
tone and force. The thought is constituted by only those features of a sen-
tence's meaning which are relevant to its truth value, and corresponds 
to what I have been calling truth-apt content. The thought is what an as-
sertoric sentence asserts; what a sentence suggests or conveys belongs to its 
tone. A particularly striking example of Frege's is sentences of the form 'X 
and Y' and 'X but Y.' While instances of these sentences express the same 
thought-in that whatever makes for the truth of one also makes for the 
truth of the other32-there is a difference in their tone, because 'X but Y' 
conveys or suggests a contrast between X and Y, which 'X and Y' does 
not. More characteristically, tone may be used to express a certain attitude 
towards the subject or the hearer, such as awe, respect, disinterest, regret, 
etc.; or else to evoke a certain attitude in the hearer. The latter is particu-
larly important if, for example, pathos or comedy are to be appropriately 
understood or have the desired effect. When evocative tone is in play, the 
beliefs and dispositions of the hearers may well be crucial. Consider, for 
example, a sentence intended by the speaker to be pathetic which has for 
the hearer a comedic value. Notably, in some cases the evocative or ex-
pressive component of a sentence's meaning may be in part determined 
by the thought, such as a double entendre or a pun where the ambiguity 
of the thought is crucial. However, where the choice of words or manner 
of expression of a thought serves to suggest different ideas, it forms part 
of a sentence's tone. 
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It serves to define the proposed style of discourse, which, in tum, de-
termines the kind of thing that may appropriately be said. We may 
speak to one another solemnly or light-heartedly, dispassionately or 
intimately, frankly or with reserve, formally or colloquially, poeti-
cally or prosaically; and all these modes represent particular forms 
of transaction between us. These complex social aspects of linguistic 
meaning are signalled by our choice of words; and, in so far as it is 
capable of serving to give such a signal, that capacity is part of the 
meaning of a word.33 
The third ingredient of a sentence's meaning, its force, distinguishes the 
particular kind of linguistic act performed in uttering the sentence. Mak-
ing an assertion, asking a question, giving a command, expressing a wish, 
are different examples of force. Two points to note about force are, first, 
sentences with different force may have the same truth-apt content. To 
entertain a thought q, to judge or assert that q is true, to ask 'Is q?' or wish 
for q; the assertion, interrogative and optative involve the same thought 
q, but have different force. Second, force is determined in part by the lin-
guistic form of the sentence such as word order or verb inflections, as well 
as associated linguistic and social conventions. For example, someone is 
asserting a thought if, subsequently convinced that the thought is untrue, 
they withdraw the claim or endeavour to make what was said true. If I as-
sert 'we are driving to London' and discover that I am driving in a differ-
ent direction, I must either concede the claim or make it true by changing 
route. To understand that a sentence is a question, in contrast, is to know 
that it calls for an answer, that the answer should depend on the content 
of the question, etc. However, the distinction between different types of 
force is more fine grained than provided for by the moods of sentences. 
For example, the interrogative form can be used to make a request or ask 
a question, 'Do you speak French?';34 the imperative mood can also be 
used to make a request, as in 'Pass the sugar, please.' Where context is not 
enough to determine the force of the utterance, we need further informa-
tion such as the speaker's intention?5 
To show how these distinctions might be applied to a field of discourse, 
I will briefly look at how they might be used to understand fictional dis-
course. My aim here is not to defend a particular account of fiction, but to 
show how the distinctions might be used to clarify the meaning of fiction-
al utterances.36 Prima facie, fictional sentences should have a force distinct 
from their use in non-fictional contexts, because when an author writes 'I 
went to the hotel, registered my alias, paid my day's rent, and was taken 
up to room 321,' we do not take this, and it is not intended, as asserting 
that any of these things happened. Consequently, fictional sentences do 
not satisfy the conventions characteristic with assertion: Presented with 
evidence that these claims are false would not be a reason for the author 
to change or withdraw them; if it were, that would be a reason to suppose 
that the material was non-fiction. Similarly, if an actor in a performance 
tells us what he is thinking, the audience do not take what is said to be 
true. So it seems that in fictional discourse, a distinctive force is in play. 
However, as Dummett points out,37 we are able to distinguish between 
assertions, questions, commands, etc. made by characters in a play, or 
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novel. If there were a conventional gesture that went along with asserting 
a sentence in speech or a conventional mark that preceded an asserted 
written sentence, we would expect the actor and author also to make 
use of them. For example, a fictional sentence being false is not a reason 
for changing it, but if a character within the context of the fictional work 
makes a claim which is found to be false, we would be puzzled if the 
character failed to withdraw the claim or at least not repeat it. Fictional 
sentences may not be genuine assertions, questions, etc., but we expect 
sentences presented as assertions within a fictional work to adhere to the 
relevant conventions. So works of fiction or dramatic performances can 
be understood as settings in which familiar types of force are transposed 
and modified such that we take them as pretend assertions, questions, etc. 
While pretend-assertion has a different force to assertion, there are simi-
larities that allow us to distinguish pretend-assertion from pretend-ques-
tion, etc. With respect to thought and tone, fictional statements should 
not in any general way differ from ordinary non-fictional sentences, since 
one finds similar thoughts expressed, and in a similar manner, both in 
fiction and non-fictional discourses. 
How does the force-tone-thought distinction apply to religious lan-
guage? I argued in Section One that religious claims have truth-apt con-
tent, and in Section Two that religious truth is robust, but also that the 
realist needs to accommodate an intimate link between religious beliefs 
and attitudes, and different standards of evidence in religious discourse. 
The force-tone-thought distinction indicates how these features of reli-
gious language may be brought together in a realist theory. The theory 
is realist because it takes religious claims to express thoughts which are 
apt for truth which is not evidentially or epistemically constrained. How-
ever, given this realist core, there is room to negotiate with regard to force 
and tone. The strategy here is straightforward. Insofar as the minimalist 
is right about there being distinct standards of religious discourse, these 
can be seen as modifying the force of religious utterances. That is, the 
non-normative role played by evidence for religious claims can be seen 
as forming part of the explanation of the force of religious assertions. So 
rather than opening up the truth-apt content of religious claims to ques-
tion, the resistance of religious claims to contrary evidence is a feature of 
the appropriate use of the vehicle of that content-in this case, religious 
assertion. Insofar as the expressivist is right about the intimate relation-
ship between religious claims and attitudes, we can allow that certain at-
titudes are both expressed and evoked by virtue of the tone of religious 
sentences without compromising their truth-apt content. Moreover, al-
lowing the expression or evocation of love, devotion, and other attitudes 
as part of the tone of religious claims, gives them a constitutive role in the 
meaning of claims in religious discourse. Not to appreciate the expressive 
and evocative component of religious language is akin, on this account, 
to sitting through a comic performance and, while grasping the thoughts 
conveyed, failing to see why they are (or might be) funny. 
In practice this strategy should allow the realist to concede to the 
minimalist and expressivist their strongest insights about the nature 
of religious language, by channelling them into features of the force 
and tone of religious language, without also conceding the truth-apt 
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content of religious claims. Moreover, by showing that attitudes can 
coexist with thoughts, and distinct internal standards can coexist with 
a robust truth predicate and truth-apt content, there remains little mo-
tivation to resist religious realism. Realism, as I argued in Sections One 
and Two, provides a better account of religious truth than either of its 
antirealist rivals; if it can also account for the distinctive features of re-
ligious language that stimulate antirealist accounts, then religious real-
ism is in a commanding position. 
If the strategy here is viable, then it should be applicable to Wittgen-
stein's remarks about religious discourse and belief. That is, it should 
be possible to understand Wittgenstein's examples of the behaviour and 
attitudes of religious believers, and the role of evidence in religious dis-
course, which the minimalist and expressivist have used to support an-
tirealist interpretations, as instead feeding into a characterisation of the 
force and tone of religious claims. Take, for instance, the following claim 
by Wittgenstein: 
Christianity is not based on a historical truth, but presents us with a 
(historical) narrative & says: now believe! But not believe this report 
with the belief that is appropriate to a historical report, - but rather: 
believe, through thick & thin & and you can do this only as the out-
come of a life. Here you have a message! -don't treat it as you would 
another historical message! Make a quite different place for it in your 
life. - There is no paradox about that!38 
Unsurprisingly, this remark has been seen as endorsing one or other kind 
of antirealism, either as arguing that while Christian claims might look 
on the surface like historical beliefs they are really attitudes, or else as 
promoting a kind of fideism by claiming the invulnerability of Christian 
belief from historical criticism. However, two important point to note are, 
first, Wittgenstein allows that historical claims form an essential part of 
the content of many Christian claims. Indeed, it is clear that a historical 
event is the subject of the belief in question. Second, Wittgenstein nowhere 
suggests that the historical evidence does not matter, or that it might not 
be crucial to the believer that the events in question really happened. So 
Wittgenstein does not question whether religious claims have truth-apt 
content (or whether they are true). He does, however, propose that in 
stating a religious belief one does more than merely assert the truth of 
its truth-apt content-i.e., assert a historical fact. Rather, the sentence ex-
presses a judgement which should have a certain role in the believer's life, 
such that it is not qualified or proportioned according to the strength of 
the evidence for it. 
Wi ttgenstein's proposal can be seen as pertaining to the force of religious 
claims. Recall that a conventional features of assertion are that the speaker 
primarily intends to say something which is true, and will withdraw or al-
ter the claim or change the circumstances that it describes, if it is shown to 
be false. I want to suggest that on Wittgenstein's account a religious claim 
is a modified form of assertion, along the lines suggested above. For while 
a religious assertion has a truth-apt content which the speaker intends and 
judges as true, it differs from non-religious assertion because the relative 
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flimsiness of the evidence or strength of contrary evidence will not lead 
the speaker to withdraw or alter it, nor (obviously) would the speaker at-
tempt to change the circumstances it describes.39 Wittgenstein's remark, 
therefore, can be seen as bearing on the distinct function of religious asser-
tion, rather than the truth-apt content that it conveys. 
Some less considered remarks of Wittgenstein's are also susceptible to 
the force-tone-thought interpretation. For example, commenting on a pas-
sage in 1 Corinthians, Wittgenstein writes 
I am reading: "& no man can say that Jesus is the Lord, but by the 
Holy Ghost." And it is true: I cannot call him Lord; because that says 
absolutely nothing to me. I could call him "the paragon", "God" 
even or rather: I can understand it when he is so called; but I cannot 
utter the word "lord" meaningfully. Because I do not believe that he 
will come to judge me; because that says nothing to me. And it could 
only say something to me if I were to live quite differently.4o 
Wittgenstein's point here can be understood as bearing on the tone of reli-
gious claims. The two sentences 'Jesus is God' and 'Jesus is Lord' may con-
vey the same thought, i.e., have the same truth conditions, but they have 
a different tone. While both claims convey with their sincere utterance 
certain attitudes and commitments, to say 'Jesus is Lord' expresses in an 
overt way religious devotion and obedience. The contrast in tone between 
the two sentences can be brought out by considering what would be in-
volved in supposing that one of these claims is true. In supposing (or con-
jecturing or hypothesising) a claim, one does not judge or assert that the 
claim is true or take into account its implied meaning, but considers what 
difference is made were it true, that is, one entertains the thought stripped 
of its usual tone and force. In the case of 'Jesus is God' there is little diffi-
culty in entertaining the thought that Jesus is God, or understanding what 
would be meant by asserting it, without believing it. Similarly, one can 
consider what difference would be made were Jesus Lord, since both utter-
ances convey the same thought. But in the latter case, 'Jesus is Lord' clearly 
means significantly more than just what is given by the thought, for this 
way of expressing the thought is tied to a much more complicated back-
ground of attitudes and religious practice than 'Jesus is God.' As a result, 
the meaning of 'Jesus is Lord' is more difficult to appreciate for someone 
such as a non-believer (or in this case Wittgenstein) who does not share or 
is not familiar with those attitudes. 
Wittgenstein's example brings out two features of religious tone. First, 
there is the importance of an appreciation of tone in understanding what 
is said; grasping the intimacy, seriousness or-most clearly in this case-
the devotion with which something is said may be as important in com-
prehending its meaning as grasping what the sentence is about. Second, 
in general, for tone to be meant by the speaker or understood by the au-
dience depends on the appreciation of possibly highly nuanced distinc-
tions in language, and this requires training in language and developed 
sensitivity to context, the speaker's attitudes and impressions that should 
be conveyed by a sentence. So Wittgenstein can be read as saying that 
religious devotion, and more generally sharing religious commitments 
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and attitudes, is required not only for the sincere utterance of certain 
religious claims but also for sensitivity to their meaning, and specifically 
their tone. Wittgenstein makes a related point in the following remark: 
'In religion it must be the case that corresponding to every level of de-
voutness there is a form of expression that has no sense at a lower level. 
For those still at the lower level this doctrine, which means something at 
the higher levet is null & void; it can only be understood wrongly, & so 
these worlds are not valid for such a person.'41 With regard to Wittgen-
stein's example of 'Jesus is the Lord' and 'Jesus is God,' the point is not 
that the latter lacks a tone, but rather that its tone is sufficiently familiar 
to be accessible to the non-believer. 
In the opening section of his lectures on religious belief Wittgenstein 
writes 
Suppose that someone believed in the Last Judgement, and I don't, 
does this mean that I believe the opposite to him, just that there won't 
be such a thing? I would say: "not at all, or not always." 
If someone said: "Wittgenstein, do you believe in this?" I'd say: "No." 
"Do you contradict the man?" I'd say: "No." 
These comments have been much discussed and are clearly open to an 
expressivist reading: Wittgenstein and the believer do not contradict be-
cause they are merely expressing different attitudes. But it is a problem 
Jor the expressivist account that Wittgenstein does allow that there is such 
a thing as believing the opposite, and that it may sometimes (though 'not 
always') consist just in believing that there will not be a Last Judgement; 
also, Wittgenstein nowhere suggests that the beliefs are compatible. On 
the reading that I am suggesting there is a respect in which the beliefs are 
clearly inconsistent-they express inconsistent thoughts about the occur-
rence of the Last Judgement. But this captures only part of the story of 
what is meant. Regarding tone, the belief in the Last Judgement expresses 
an attitude to human behaviour and its end result, whereas disbelief in 
the Last Judgement only requires that one does not have such a stance. 
Regarding force, the denial that there will be a Last Judgement is an ordi-
nary assertion, the truth of which is evaluated according to the evidence 
for and plausibility of the belief; the religious assertion that there will be a 
Last Judgement is not similarly dependent on an evaluation of evidence. 
For example, the religious believer may recognise that the available em-
pirical evidence is not persuasive, indeed strongly against the belief, but 
not see that as a reason to doubt its occurrence. 
When the different components of meaning are considered, while Witt-
genstein and the believer have contrary thoughts, they do not 'mean the 
opposite,' because their claims have different force and tone: they play 
different roles in their lives and convey different attitudes. To mean some-
thing genuinely opposed to the believer in the Last Judgement would re-
quire the assertion of, e.g., a rival eschatological theory (i.e., a contrary 
thought with similar force and tone but inconsistent thoughts). The non-
believer, in contrast, while disagreeing with the believer about the fact of 
whether the Last Judgement will occur, in other respects does not address 
332 Faith and Philosophy 
what the religious believer means. Not meaning the opposite in this sense, 
however, is consistent with the realist view that the two claims convey 
truth-apt and inconsistent thoughts. 
On the reading of Wittgenstein that I have proposed, he is not primarily 
concerned to comment on that aspect of religious meaning with which the 
realist is most interested to secure, namely its truth-apt content and the ro-
bust kind of truth for which religious sentences are apt. Indeed, the truth-
apt content is assumed. Rather, he focuses on the kind of linguistic act a 
religious utterance is, the use and context of religious claims, and the at-
mosphere, attitudes and experiences appropriate to religious expression; 
in short, the force and tone. The aim of this interpretation is to provide an 
account of a substantial and insightful component of Wittgenstein's re-
marks on religion, i.e., the differences that he observes between religious 
and other fields of discourse. I do not claim to offer an exhaustive real-
ist account of everything Wittgenstein says about religion (his comments 
on miracles is one problem example); however, neither expressivist nor 
minimalist can claim this for their interpretations either. More to the point, 
realism has the advantage of being a good theory; insofar as Wittgenstein 
diverges from it, therefore, so much the worse for Wittgenstein. 
I will conclude this section by looking at a couple of objections. It may 
seem that the account of the content and particularly the force of religious 
claims is inconsistent with the variant of the Frege-Geach argument used 
in Section One to show that attitudes cannot do justice to the logic of reli-
gious belief. Surely the same difficulty will arise if the expression of non-
representational states is built into the meaning of religious claims by way 
of their tone? 
However, this is simply answered: the laws of logic are preserved with-
in religious discourse because religious claims have truth-apt content. The 
validity of a religious argument is, as in other fields of discourse, the pres-
ervation of truth from premises to conclusion. If religious claims have a 
tone, such as expressing devotion, that is part of the meaning of assertions 
of faith, but will not affect what makes for a logically valid religious argu-
ment. If the conclusion to an argument does not logically follow, then the 
argument will not be valid even if the sentence has an appropriate tone. 
Moreover, since religious discourse is informed by standards of logic, a 
claim with the right tone but inconsistent with other accepted religious 
beliefs will not be acceptable, once the inconsistency is discovered.42 Tone 
is important to the way in which a content is expressed or the suitability 
of expressing a content in a given context, but it has no bearing on the 
specific question of validity or consistency. 
A second objection is that Wittgenstein does not himself make use of 
the notions of force, tone or thought, and to apply it to his remarks on 
religion may seem to saddle him with Fregean distinctions that he would 
have rejected in favour of considerations about the use of religious claims. 
Moreover, doesn't Wittgenstein's family resemblance argument, which 
shows that there need be no common component to all the uses of an 
expression, tell against the proposal that an account of the meaning of 
religious claims could be divided into thought, force and tone? 
One motivation for Wittgenstein rejecting the Fregean distinctions 
as an account of sentence meaning is that he accepts a very minimal 
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(indeed a redundancy) theory of truth. If 'It is true that ft: is equivalent to 
'A' then the meaning of 'ft: cannot be given by explaining the conditions 
under which it is true, for the latter would presuppose an understand-
ing of the formerY Consequently the 'thought' component of a sentence 
cannot playa substantial role in accounting for its meaning. However, 
if, as I have argued, religious truth cannot be given a satisfactory mini-
mal construal, then the conditions under which a sentence is true should 
playa substantial role in the characterisation of its meaning (and use). 
Moreover, a sentence's thought and tone should also typically feature 
in an analysis of its use, so in general the force-tone-thought distinction 
should present the Wittgensteinian with a convenient way of carving up 
an investigation into a sentence's use. The family resemblance argument 
might be thought to show that the Wittgensteinian should eschew broad 
categories of sentence use in favour of a more piecemeal approach, i.e., 
classification of the features of individual sentences or small groups of 
them. However, the family resemblance argument only supports the 
conclusion that there need be no common feature to all the different uses 
of a concept or expression; it does not show that such common features 
are usually lacking, or that we cannot delineate a class of uses of an ex-
pression with common features. Moreover, it is not being claimed that 
force, tone and thought completely exhaust the content of a sentence: if 
any important feature of meaning is missed by this approach, it is open 
to the Wittgensteinian to point this out and add it to the account. So, 
short of finding any failing in the force-tone-thought account, the Witt-
gensteinian can take a conciliatory approach to its use in understanding 
religious claims. 
4. Conclusion 
This paper offers a realist defence of religious language and truth. More-
over, the arguments offered here give some flexibility to someone sympa-
thetic to a realist position: someone unpersuaded by the case for distinc-
tive internal standards for religious discourse, or the motivational force 
of religious belief, can still make use of the arguments establishing the 
falsity of expressivism and minimalism, and adjust the account of force 
and tone accordingly. 
The case for realism about religious language and truth does not, of 
course, constitute a defence of religious realism broadly construed. In 
two notable respects, the realist will want to address further questions: 
first, to show that religious claims are actually true; second, to resist a 
reductionist thesis about religious ontology. Realism about religious lan-
guage does, however, have a significant bearing on both of these issues. 
First, expressivism must be ruled out for issues concerning either reli-
gious ontology or truth (of the relevant kind) to come into play. Second, 
religious truth needs to be non-minimal for the question about whether 
religious claims are true or false to be a substantial philosophical con-
cern; if truth is minimal, then the truth of religious claims would be gov-
erned-and at least in some cases trivially established-by the satisfac-
tion of the internal standards of religious discourse.44 Third, if religious 
truth is non-minimal, the reductionist will have to provide a model con-
334 Faith and Philosophy 
sistent with this, i.e., one that shows how the supposed class of entities 
to which religious ontology is to be reduced support an epistemically 
and evidentially unconstrained truth predicate. While there are possible 
reductionist theses that are consistent with a realist account of religious 
truth, the onus will be on the reductionist to provide a plausible class of 
entities that satisfy these semantic conditions.45 
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